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ABSTRACT
Impediments to resolving IPv6 router aliases have precluded
understanding the emerging router-level IPv6 Internet topol-
ogy. In this work, we design, implement, and validate the
first Internet-scale alias resolution technique for IPv6. Our
technique, speedtrap, leverages the ability to induce frag-
mented IPv6 responses from router interfaces in a particu-
lar temporal pattern that produces distinguishing per-router
fingerprints. Our algorithm surmounts three fundamental
challenges to Internet-scale IPv6 alias resolution using frag-
ment identifier values: (1) unlike for IPv4, the identifier
counters on IPv6 routers have no natural velocity, (2) the
values of these counters are similar across routers, and (3)
the packet size required to collect inferences is 46 times
larger than required in IPv4. We demonstrate the efficacy
of the technique by producing router-level Internet IPv6
topologies using measurements from CAIDA’s distributed
infrastructure. Our preliminary work represents a step to-
ward understanding the Internet’s IPv6 router-level topol-
ogy, an important objective with respect to IPv6 network
resilience, security, policy, and longitudinal evolution.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.5 [Local and Wide-Area Networks]: Internet; C.2.1
[Network Architecture and Design]: Network topology;
C.2.3 [Computer Communication Networks]: Network
Operations—network monitoring
Keywords
Internet topology; alias resolution; IPv6
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet operations and engineering community is
putting significant effort into deploying IPv6 [10, 8, 6]. As
IPv6 gains importance, the research community is in a po-
sition to study the deployment of this new Internet proto-
col using lessons learned studying the IPv4 Internet [5]. In
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this paper, we introduce speedtrap, our Internet-scale IPv6
alias resolution technique. IPv6 alias resolution is the pro-
cess of determining if two IP addresses are assigned to dif-
ferent interfaces of the same physical router [15]. speed-
trap is an active measurement technique that reduces an
interface-level graph inferred from traceroute measurements
to a router-level graph, facilitating better understanding of
the resilience and robustness properties of the network [30].
Several IPv4 router alias inference techniques exist, each
empirically providing varying degrees of success such that a
combination of methods yields the best results: Ally [27],
RadarGun [2], and MIDAR [16] use the Identifier (ID) field
built into the IPv4 header; DisCarte [25] uses the record
route IP option and graph analysis; Mercator [11] uses com-
mon source addresses in reply packets; Sherry et al. [24]
use the pre-specified timestamp IP option. However, these
methods rely on characteristics of IPv4 that are not present
in IPv6. The IPv6 header does not include an ID field, there
is no record route or pre-specified timestamp options, and
the source address of ICMP6 responses must match the des-
tination probed if it exists on the host [7].
Because of the protocol-level differences between IPv4 and
IPv6, prior work on IPv6 alias resolution has sought protocol
features in IPv6 that could be exploited to resolve aliases, in
particular the IPv6 source routing feature (e.g. [29, 23, 22]).
However, the IPv6 source routing has been deprecated [1]
and the number of probes required scale O(N2) with the
number of interfaces to compare. More recently, we showed
that it is possible to obtain ID values in IPv6 useful for
alias resolution by inducing routers to send fragments [4].
However, that method scales O(N2), limiting its application.
This paper describes an Internet-scale application of the
technique, dubbed speedtrap as it induces velocity in nor-
mally stationary ID counters; other than responses to our
probes, routers do not send fragments. We show its efficacy
by running it on the IPv6 Internet where we obtain ≈ 11k
routers from ≈ 53k interfaces. Validation against ground
truth from network operators yields 451 of 453 correct infer-
ences, comprising 2% of the 11,181 routers we infer. While
not exhaustive, our technique represents a step toward un-
derstanding the IPv6 topology. speedtrap is implemented in
the freely available scamper [19] tool, and the IPv6 router-
level graphs are available from CAIDA. The remainder of
the paper reviews related work (§2), details the speedtrap
algorithm (§3), and presents results (§4). We then provide
preliminary properties of the IPv6 topology (§5) and suggest
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Figure 1: The Monotonic Bounds Test (MBT) used
by MIDAR. For two interfaces to share a counter,
non-overlapping IPID samples must strictly in-
crease. The horizontal lines with each sample indi-
cate the length of time each probe was outstanding
in the network. The boxes between IPID samples
from A show the bounds within which samples from
aliases must be observed. The MBT suggests that A
and C share a counter, but that A and B do not. The
samples annotated with (a) are not used to deter-
mine shared counter status because it is not possible
to determine packet arrival order.
2. RELATED WORK
Three alias resolution techniques for IPv4 use the ID field:
Ally [27], RadarGun [2] and MIDAR [16], with RadarGun
addressing scaling issues of Ally, and MIDAR addressing ac-
curacy issues of RadarGun. A fundamental property these
techniques exploit is that many router implementations use
a single, shared ID counter across all of their interfaces. This
section summarizes this prior work, with particular focus on
the Monotonic Bounds Test (MBT) used by MIDAR, a mod-
ified version of which is utilized by speedtrap; [16] contains
a thorough discussion of MIDAR’s MBT and the accuracy
of Ally, RadarGun, and MIDAR.
Ally’s main limitation is that the number of probe packets
required to resolve a graph for aliases scales O(N2) with the
number of interfaces in the graph. RadarGun [2] surmounts
Ally’s scaling limitation by sending probes to all interfaces
in multiple rounds to build a time series: two interfaces are
then aliases if they both produce a linear time series and the
time series are within a threshold. Unfortunately, the time
series of two different routers can be within the threshold,
producing a false router. MIDAR [16] provides better ac-
curacy than RadarGun by using a Monotonic Bounds Test
(MBT). The MBT is illustrated in figure 1: for two inter-
faces to be aliases, the ID values returned from a sequence
of non-overlapping probes must strictly increase over time.
If they do not, as with the points annotated with (b) in fig-
ure 1, then the interfaces cannot be using a shared counter.
In this paper, we use the MBT of MIDAR for speedtrap.
We tailor our probing algorithm to features and challenges
unique to IPv6, specifically: (1) no ID field in the IPv6
header, thus requiring us to induce the interface to send
an IPv6 fragment header [4], (2) a 32-bit ID counter, as
opposed to 16-bit in IPv4, (3) lack of ID velocity (see §3),
and (4) the absence of entropy in ID values from unrelated
routers. Further, to elicit an IPv6 fragment ID as in [4], we
must manage the load induced by the large probe packets
we require.
3. TECHNIQUE AND DATA
In this section, we describe the primitive we used to infer
aliases, issues in applying existing alias resolution techniques
to IPv6, and the Internet-scale alias resolution technique
we use to infer aliases. We also describe our application of
the technique to the IPv6 interface-level graph captured by
CAIDA’s Archipelago (Ark) infrastructure [14] for March
2013. The graph consists of all the 52,986 IPv6 interfaces
numbered within the 2000::/3 unicast prefix captured from
all 27 Ark vantage points (VPs) with IPv6 connectivity.
3.1 Obtaining and using the IPv6 ID field
The IPv6 header differs from the IPv4 header in many
ways; one important difference is the absence of the ID field
used for fragmentation and reassembly. The IPv6 proto-
col shifts the burden of fragmentation to the sender; no in-
network packet fragmentation is done by routers. If a sender
must fragment a packet, it includes an IPv6 extension header
on the fragments which includes a 32-bit ID field necessary
for reassembly.
Building on our technique in [4], speedtrap obtains an ID
field by sending a router an ICMP packet too big message
(PTB) with an MTU field smaller than the size of the pack-
ets solicited from it. In this work, we send 1300-byte ICMP
echo request packets; when we receive 1300-byte echo replies,
we send the router a PTB message with an MTU of 1280
bytes. If the router follows the IPv6 protocol [9], it will
subsequently send (induced) fragmented echo replies to our
hosts. In our dataset, 32.1% of interfaces we probed sent
fragmented echo replies with incrementing ID field values;
17.9% sent responses with a random value in the ID field,
and 50.0% did not send fragments because they either did
not respond to the echo request (30.2%), or appeared to
ignore PTB messages (19.8%). Section 4.4 reports on the
marginal gains possible by probing interfaces from multiple
VPs; a different VP may receive fragmented responses from
a router where another VP received no response. To bet-
ter understand IPv6 fragmentation behavior implemented
in various hardware, we obtained hardware ground truth
from several commercial service providers via email com-
munication. In our testing, routers manufactured by Cisco,
Huawei, Vyatta, HP, and Mikrotik all return sequential frag-
ment identifiers; only Juniper routers, originally based on
BSD, return random identifiers. Inevitably an IPv6 router-
level map will be composed using multiple complementary
inference techniques, as with IPv4.
Soliciting fragments requires us to send large (>1280 byte)
probe packets, compared with IPv4 where 28-byte probe
packets are sufficient. The requirement to send packets 46
times larger than sent in IPv4 restricts the rate at which
packets can be sent. However, we have found it rare for
routers to fragment traffic in their normal operation. When
we began our work, 28% of probed interfaces replied with an
initial fragment ID value of zero or one [4], suggesting they
had not sent any fragmented traffic since booting. Figure 2
shows the distribution of IPID values derived from a counter:
80% of the samples occupy 0.00002% of the sample space
(i.e. have an ID < 1000 where the ID is a 232 bit value).
Except for responses to our alias resolution probes, routers
do not currently source fragmented traffic and so there is no
background velocity. It seems unlikely that there will be
background velocity in the future. ICMP error messages are
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Figure 2: The first IPID value observed from April
2013 interfaces where a counter was inferred. Be-
cause there is no natural velocity to the ID counter
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Figure 3: Length of time between sending a PTB
and the final fragmented packet received from in-
terfaces that assign IDs from a counter. 78% of in-
terfaces send fragments for at least two hours; 8.7%
send fragments for 10 minutes, and 0.8% send frag-
ments for 5 minutes.
tation [7], and it is unlikely that routing protocol traffic will
be fragmented in the future if it is not currently.
The minimum MTU in IPv6 is 1280 bytes; it is possi-
ble to send 5TB before the 32-bit field contains a duplicate
value. Therefore, we can conduct Internet-scale alias reso-
lution with a moderate probing rate without impairing our
ability to accurately infer aliases. Routers are required to
cache the Path-MTU when they receive a PTB. How long
a router caches the Path-MTU depends on the implementa-
tion; RFC1981 [20] requires a system to cache for at least
five minutes and recommends at least ten minutes. Figure 3
shows that a small fraction of routers cache for the recom-
mended length of time; 78% of interfaces send our host frag-
ments for at least two hours after we sent it a PTB message.
This caching helps because it reduces the number of PTB
messages sent to routers during the alias resolution process.
3.2 Speedtrap algorithm
We use the same MBT test as is used by MIDAR: for two
interfaces to be aliases, the IPID sequence received from
non-overlapping probes must strictly increase. Our probing
strategy is tailored to determine aliases using the minimum
number of probe packets necessary given that the ID field
has no velocity except that caused by our probing. Briefly,
we (1) determine the set of interfaces in our set that send
responses with an IPID derived from a counter, (2) deter-
mine which interfaces appear to share a counter, (3) try to


























Figure 4: Grouping interfaces during step 2. The
vertical bars represent the time a probe is out-
standing in the network: between when we transmit
and then receive a reply. Each group includes only
probes transmitted before a response to the first was
received. These groups can then be probed in par-
allel if there is no overlap between members of the
groups in time: #1 and #3 can be probed simulta-
neously, but #2 cannot be probed at the same time
as #1 because G and H (in #2) were transmitted
before F (in #1) was received.
cause the counters of distinct routers to diverge, and (4)
confirm aliases with pairwise probing. Given the absence
of velocity in ID counters and the large probes required for
the technique to work, we probe at a low rate of 20pps from
a single VP, producing 26Kbps of traffic. We evaluate the
performance of our technique in section 4.
Step 1: determine IPID behavior of interfaces. We
send each interface six echo requests one second apart. We
probe interfaces in a sliding window: probing at 20pps means
we test 20 different interfaces at a time. We infer the inter-
face is deriving fragment ID values from a counter provided
we receive at least three responses and the difference in ID
values for adjacent responses is less than 65,535. In practice,
99.8% of interfaces return perfectly sequential IPID values
during this step if they use a counter. This step prevents
the following stages from sending probes that will not help
resolve router aliases.
Step 2: solicit a sequence of non-overlapping frag-
ments from all interface-pairs. To test if interfaces A
and B are aliases, we obtain a sequence of ID values A-B-A
or B-A-B where the probes soliciting the ID values were not
overlapping. We break this step into three rounds. In each
round, we solicit a single ID value from every interface that
we inferred to be deriving ID values from a counter; if we
do not receive a fragment (and thus no ID value), we probe
the interface up to two further times after waiting at least
one second.
In the first round, we solicit a single fragmented response
from all interfaces, probing in parallel to obtain samples
quickly. Because this first round of probing is conducted in
parallel, many ID samples are taken while multiple probes
were in flight concurrently. To obtain the non-overlapping
sequence necessary to infer if two interfaces might share a
counter, we assemble groups of interfaces where the previ-
ous samples were overlapping in the network. In the second
round, we solicit a single fragmented response from each in-
terface in the group one at a time. Figure 4 illustrates the
grouping process: we visit samples in order of their trans-
mission time and assemble a group by including all probes
subsequently transmitted before the response to the first
probe in the group was was received. To achieve time ef-
ficiency, we probe interface groups in parallel provided no
members overlap between the groups in time. In Figure 4,
group #2 cannot be probed at the same time as #1 be-
cause of overlap between samples from F, G, and H; how-
ever, we can probe group #3 at the same time we probe
group #1 because no samples were taken concurrently. In
the third round, we solicit a single fragmented response from
all interfaces in parallel as we did in round one. On com-
pletion, we have obtained packet triplets (A-B-A or B-A-B)
with non-overlapping probes for all pairs of interfaces (A, B),
which allows us to test whether the interfaces might share a
counter.
Step 3: distill candidate routers. We use the data
acquired in step 2 to produce sets using a transitive closure
(TC) of all interface-pairs that individually passed the MBT
using the samples obtained in step 2. Because each closure
can contain multiple distinct routers, we probe the interfaces
in each closure that holds more than three interfaces, to try
to force counters on different routers to diverge. Given a
closure (A, B, C, D, E) we try to cause a divergence by
sampling an interface between every other interface in the
set, e.g. A, B, A, C, A. While the algorithm scales O(N !)
worst case, only the subset of interface-pairs that passed the
MBT in step 2 will require testing. In addition, in this step
we only have to interleave A where the previous sample was
monotonically increasing; if a sample for B did not mono-
tonically increase, then we can probe C without interleaving
A because B could not have shared a counter with A and
caused A’s counter to increment. Because the closures rep-
resent distinct routers, we can probe separate closures in
parallel without inducing rate limiting. After probing each
set, we process the interfaces to form smaller closures where
the MBT has ruled out shared counters between interfaces.
Step 4: pair-wise testing of candidate routers. The
final step is to test each candidate pair of interfaces in each
closure that remains after step 3. This step is necessary be-
cause there can be large time gaps between previous samples.
For a pair of interfaces (A, B) we probe (A, B, A, B, A) and
declare aliases if the MBT suggests a shared counter. Be-
cause the closures represent distinct routers, we again probe
separate closures in parallel. The output from this process
is a set of routers and their associated interface addresses.
4. RESULTS
This section provides our results. We first detail our real-
world alias success rate, and properties of the aliases we
infer. Second, we report our validation results, which relied
on a combination of methods and out-of-band interaction
with four providers. Of the inferred alias we could vali-
date, > 99% of them were correctly assigned. Third, we
evaluate the scalability of speedtrap and suggest future av-
enues of improvement to the algorithm. Fourth, we quantify
the marginal benefit of performing speedtrap from multiple
VPs to mitigate ICMP6 filtering and identify those networks
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Figure 5: CCDF of number of interfaces observed
per router, inclusive of interfaces that assign ID val-
ues from a counter. Our dataset contains a single
interface for most routers.
Step Packets Time
1 IPID behavior 317,814 5:35:44
2 Non-overlapping sequence 80,017 1:15:31
3 Distill candidate routers 34,659 1:15:43
4 Pair-wise testing 63,765 1:01:12
Total: 496,255 9:08:10
Table 1: Packets and time required to complete each
step evaluating 52,969 interfaces at 20pps. More
than half of the time is spent determining the IPID
behavior of interfaces in the set.
4.1 Inferred IPv6 Aliases
Overall, 17,002 interfaces (32.1%) sent echo replies with an
incrementing IPID value. Speedtrap inferred 11,181 routers
involving these interfaces; figure 5 shows the number of
aliases inferred for each router. We observed a single in-
terface on 68% of routers in our set, and two interfaces on
21%. Our validation in section 4.2 suggests that we only
observed a single interface on those routers with traceroute,
and not that interfaces belonging to the same router use
independent counters. The largest router we observed con-
tained 25 aliases. We are confident all aliases we inferred are
true aliases because of the cleanness of the data collected in
pair-wise testing: 11,083 of 11,086 pairs tested had perfectly
sequential ID values in step 4. Table 1 shows the number
of packets sent and the time taken to complete. Most time
is used and packets sent in step 1; in section 4.3 we show
increasing the probe rate and using multiple VPs reduces
the time required.
4.2 Validation
We obtained validation data from four networks: a large
access provider (AP), two small transit providers (STP-1,
STP-2), and a Tier-1 network. Three of the four sets of
validation data were obtained by deriving and then confirm-
ing an IP address naming convention used in DNS entries
with operators of the networks. Additional networks were
contacted but their naming conventions were not sufficiently
clean to be used as validation data. The fourth set of valida-
tion data was obtained by extracting interfaces from a RAN-
CID database [26]. Stale information was found in three of
the four sources of validation data, including the RANCID
database, which required in-depth discussion with the net-
work operators involved. Table 2 shows the outcome of our
Validation name STP-1 STP-2 AP Tier1
Data source RANCID DNS DNS DNS
Routers
Incr. IPID 43 40 86 50
Random IPID 43 85 98
No Fragments 11 84 77
No Echo replies 8 11
Mixed 4 3
Total Routers 70 94 267 239
Interfaces 151/750 85/279 138/1008 79/625
Correct 150/151 85/85 137/138 79/79
Table 2: Validation of IP to router assignments.
Overall, 451 of 453 (99.6%) of assignments were cor-
rect. There exists surprising heterogeneity in router
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Figure 6: Data collection rate measured by packets-
per-second (PPS) over time. Steps 1 (IPID behavior
classification) and 2 (non-overlapping sequence) are
limited by the configured PPS rate. Steps 3 (distill
candidate routers) and 4 (pair-wise testing) are al-
gorithmically limited). The reduction in PPS rate
immediately before step 3 is due to O(N2) (pair-wise)
IP-ID comparisons that distill the candidate routers.
validation exercise. Overall, 451 of 453 (99.8%) assignments
were made correctly, and we validated 219 of 11,181 routers
(2%). The two incorrect assignments were where a single
interface was not correctly matched with its aliases, imply-
ing that we observed no aliases for the two interfaces. Both
cases were due to our not receiving a response to probes sent
in round 2 of step 2.
4.3 Scalability
Figure 6 evaluates the scalability of speedtrap, focusing on
the PPS rate as data collection progressed. We configured
scamper’s probing rate at 20pps; for nearly the first seven of
nine hours the experiment is limited by the configured prob-
ing rate; increasing the probing rate or using a distributed
set of vantage points linearly reduces the time taken to com-
plete these steps. Steps 3 and 4 are algorithmically limited;
because we only probe one address in each candidate router
at a time, the time these steps take to complete is limited
by the size of the largest candidate router. At present, steps
3 and 4 probe all pairs of addresses in a candidate router.
These steps can be improved by building a transitive closure
as addresses are evaluated; if an incrementing sequence of
IP-ID values is observed probing addresses A and B, then
both A and B do not need to be tested against C. With a
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Figure 7: Dependence on vantage point (VP). We
observed ≈9% of interfaces that were unresponsive
from the first VP responding from at least one
of eight different VPs. We observed diminishing
marginal success with more vantage points.
ing rate results in a linear reduction of the time to complete
steps 1 and 2, and that steps 3 and 4 are currently algorith-
mically limited. As with MIDAR [16] and RadarGun [2], the
number of packets required scales linearly with the number
of interfaces to test.
4.4 Dependence on Vantage Point
We examined the impact of ICMP6 and fragment filtering
by focusing on the set of 10,497 interfaces (19.8%) that do
not send fragmented packets after we respond to their echo
reply with a PTB, a set we term PTB-ignorant. Since we
cannot know whether the PTB message arrived at the des-
tination, we instead study their responsiveness using eight
Ark VPs distributed around the world (2 in North Amer-
ica, 4 in Europe, 1 in Asia, 1 in Australia). Figure 7 shows
the cumulative fraction of the PTB-ignorant interfaces ver-
sus the number of VPs that received a fragmented response.
Overall, 9,548 (≈ 91%) of these still did not receive frag-
ments from any of the eight VPs, implying that filtering is
close to the interfaces. 949 interfaces that were seemingly
PTB-ignorant replied with fragments when probed from a
different VP. Of the 949 interfaces, only 7.2% returned se-
quential IDs; we leave understanding why the behavior of
these interfaces differs from the whole set to future work.
We then mapped interfaces to autonomous systems (ASes)
using the longest matching prefix observed in BGP. For 3%
of ASes, all of their PTB-ignorant interfaces were reachable
from at least one of the eight VPs. However, for 87% of
the ASes, none of their interfaces returned fragments when
probed from any of our eight VPs. These findings suggest
that various forms of ICMP6 filtering exist in the production
IPv6 Internet, perhaps due to security concerns [18].
We therefore performed tomography to infer which ASes
might filter PTBs. We performed a traceroute from each
of our 8 VPs to infer the forward paths to the interfaces,
and then used the global IPv6 BGP table as available from
Routeviews [21] to infer the forward AS path. Thus, from
each VP to each candidate interface, we have both the AS
path, and an understanding of whether that path returned
fragments. For all (V P, interface) paths where we received
fragments, we infer that no ICMP6 filtering is in place for
the ASes along that path, and assemble a set of ASes that
do not filter. Then, for all paths where we received unfrag-























Figure 8: CCDF of IPv6 interface and router degree,
inferred from 4.9M Ark traces (Apr, 2013).
path that is not in the unfiltered set. This first“closed”AS is
likely the root of the filtering, since it appears in none of the
AS paths where fragments are returned. We gathered the
most prevalent ASes that likely filter ICMP6, which include:
5511 (France Telecom), 3265 (XS4ALL), 6327 (Shaw), 7843
(TimeWarner), 10026 (Pacnet), and 3209 (Vodafone). Thus,
performing speedtrap from multiple VPs can decrease the
fraction of interfaces that do not return fragments, and in-
crease the number of inferred aliases.
5. TOWARD AN IPV6 ROUTER MAP
We used speedtrap to resolve the IPv6 interface topol-
ogy obtained from Ark during April 2013 into a router-
level topology. The April 2013 data includes 4.9M IPv6
traces. Our analysis considered only the portion of the trace
containing hops that sent ICMP6 time-exceeded messages.
Using the speedtrap-inferred aliases, we reduced the graph
from 49,542 distinct IPv6 interfaces connected by 165,832
edges (average degree of 6.69) to 42,929 nodes connected by
144,377 edges. 39,049 of the 49,542 interfaces (79%) have no
known alias, which is similar to the corresponding ratio in a
recent study of IPv4 aliases [12]. Figure 8 is a complemen-
tary CDF of the node degree distribution for the Ark IPv6
interface and speedtrap router-level topologies.
We manually investigated the 81 nodes with degree 100
or greater. 25 of 81 belong to the Tiscali group, includ-
ing Tinet/Intelliquent, while 11 nodes belong to Level 3.
Ten of these large degree nodes correspond to Hurricane
Electric (HE) tunnel broker [13] servers, with ams1.he.net
and fra1.he.net having 405 and 303 interfaces respectively.
Within the IP-level topology and without alias resolution,
ams1.he.net was inferred to be different nodes of degree
218, 194, 178, 189, 136, where some of the IPv6 interfaces
corresponded to address space other than that owned by HE.
This example illuminates the danger in using interface-level
topologies, and the value in alias resolution for IPv6, where
individual nodes may be disproportionately important at
this stage of IPv6 evolution, or in the future. This finding
is consistent with other recent measurements of BGP paths
where HE, Level 3, and Tinet also appear as important parts
of the IPv6 topology [10].
A limitation of our approach is that 17.9% of interfaces
return random fragment identifiers, a function of the un-
derlying router implementation. Unfortunately, MBT can-
not make alias inferences over interfaces that return random
identifiers. One potential enhancement to our technique is
to use the PTB MTU as a nonce such that an alias of the
interface to which the PTB is sent would return fragments
of a distinguishing size. The ability to leverage MTU size
for IPv6 alias resolution depends on the PMTU destina-
tion cache being shared across interfaces. In our testing, we
find that Huawei, Vyatta, HP, and Mikrotik use a shared
per-destination PMTU cache. However, we can already re-
solve aliases of these devices using speedtrap. Unfortunately,
Juniper routers use a per-interface, per-destination PMTU
cache. Thus, resolving the aliases of Juniper routers remains
an open problem.
6. CONCLUSION
While researchers continue to make progress toward un-
derstanding the Internet’s IPv4 topology, little is known
about the IPv6 router-level topology. Relying on interface
topologies such as those revealed by traceroute yields in-
correct inferences and conclusions about the structure and
resilience of the network [17, 30]. Alias resolution is crucial
to producing a topology that represents actual equipment
(routers and links). In IPv6, tunnels and virtual interfaces
are common, and one cannot assume that nodes in the net-
work core have low degree as might be dictated by physical
router density constraints. Similarly, tunnels can directly
connect distant IPv6 routers over many IPv4 hops. Under-
standing the IPv6 router-level topology is thus important
both from security and Internet evolution perspectives [5].
We do not claim that our inferred IPv6 router-level topol-
ogy is representative of the IPv6 Internet. In particular,
our current research explores how to more efficiently and ef-
fectively perform active probes in IPv6 amid large amounts
of topological sparsity encountered in random probes [3].
Further, combining graph analysis techniques such as those
detailed in [15] will likely uncover additional router-level
structure. However, our work represents an important step
forward in more completely understanding the true IPv6
topology, and the first IPv6 router-level topologies.
In February 2013 the IETF updated the specification of
the ID field in IPv4 so that the ID field is only set when a
packet is fragmented [28]. If this RFC is followed, speedtrap
will soon be required for IPv4 router alias resolution as well
as IPv6. A related question is what fraction of IPv4 routers
that set a constant (zero) ID field would set an incrementing
IPID field if they were required to fragment responses.
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